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IN THE FEDERAL HIGH COURT OF NIGERIA, ABUJA DIVISION 
HOLDEN AT THE FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY, ABUJA 
 
In the Matter of an Application by David Anyaele and Emmanuel Egbuna for 
Judicial Review and/or Acts Done Pursuant to the National Commission for 
Refugees etc. Act (Cap.244, LFN 1990) 
 
Between  
 
David Anyaele and Emmanuel Egbuna, Applicants 
 
AND 
 
Charles Ghankay Taylor et al., Respondents 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief submitted by the Open Society Justice Initiative 
 
Summary 
 
1. This brief, filed by the Open Society Justice Initiative as amicus curiae in the case of 
David Anyaele and Emmanuel Egbuna vs. Charles Ghankay Taylor et al., before the 
Federal High Court of Nigeria, summarizes the most relevant aspects of international 
criminal law pertinent to the present proceedings regarding the former President of 
Liberia, Charles Ghankay Taylor. The brief gives an overview of the key legal issues 
and obligations resting upon States under international law, including the extent of 
immunity due former Heads of State, the scope of the obligation to surrender or 
prosecute persons accused of serious international crimes, and the requirement to 
deny refugee status to such persons. It asserts that a) international law requires that 
persons accused of crimes against humanity and war crimes be brought to justice and 
that b) there is a duty on States to deny refuge to persons accused of the most serious 
international crimes. Exclusion is required when there is “clear and credible 
evidence” that an individual has committed serious crimes. Charles Taylor, accused 
of serious international crimes by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, should thus be 
denied refuge in Nigeria and extradited to the Special Court to stand trial. 
 
Submitting Organization 
  
2. The Open Society Justice Initiative pursues law reform activities grounded in the 
protection of human rights, and contributes to the development of legal capacity for 
open societies. It has offices in Budapest (Hungary), New York (United States) and 
Abuja (Nigeria). A major objective of the Justice Initiative's work is to promote 
accountability for international crimes in international and hybrid courts, including 
through preparation of legal submissions on questions of law, assistance in carrying 
out investigations and reports, collaboration with NGOs to improve the selection 
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process for international judiciaries, and support for publication and dissemination of 
international tribunal decisions.*  
 
A. International Law Requires That Persons Accused of Crimes Against 
Humanity and War Crimes Be Brought to Justice 
 
3. It is well settled that all States are subject to a set of fundamental obligations under 
international law to hold to account those who credible evidence suggests have 
committed the most egregious crimes of concern to the international community as a 
whole.1 These obligations flow primarily from international criminal law, a body of 
law with core principles established at customary and convent ional law.  
 
4. Since the early 1990s, the field of international criminal law has witnessed significant 
advances. Legal regulation of international crimes, particularly war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and genocide, has been refined and solidified. New institutions 
have been established and seminal judgments have been handed down both nationally 
and internationally. Institutions such as the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), created by the United Nations 
Security Council in 1993 and 1994 respectively, acting under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, have added substance and clarity to the proscriptions of international 
criminal law and international humanitarian law. Additionally, following long and 
rigorous negotiation by States, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) was signed on July 17, 1998.2 The ICC Statute currently has 97 States Parties; 
it entered into force on July 1, 2002. Nigeria ratified the Statute on September 27, 
2001. The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) was established by an Agreement 
between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on October 4, 2000, 
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000). 
 
5. Within the past 11 years, some seven international/ized courts have been established, 
namely the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, the International Criminal Court, the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, and internationalized courts in East Timor, Kosovo, 
and Cambodia (in final stages of establishment).3 These efforts, the most concerted since 
the post World War II trials held in the mid to late 1940s in Nuremberg and Tokyo, 
demonstrate convincingly the increasing resolve of the international community to enforce 
international law, and end impunity for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. 
                                                 
* The Justice Initiative is indebted to Deirdre Clancy, Co-Director of the International Refugee Rights 
Initiative, for her collaboration with the Justice Initiative on this brief.  
1 See generally M.C. Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity in International Criminal Law, 2nd ed. (The 
Hague: Kluwer, 1999); Yoram Dinstein & M. Tabory, ed., War Crimes in International Law (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1996); N. Jørgensen, The Responsibility of States for International Crimes (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000); Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age: Essays (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1998); Diane Orentlicher, “Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations 
of a Prior Regime” (1991) 100 Yale L.J. 2537; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ed., Impunity and Human Rights in 
International Law and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); William A. Schabas, Criminal 
Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights (2003).  
2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.A/CONF.183/9; 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, entered 
into force 1 July 2002 [hereafter Rome Statute or ICC Statute]. 
3 See generally G.A. Knoops, An Introduction to the Law of International Criminal Tribunals: A 
Comparative Study (2003). 
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Even when it is virtually impossible for all perpetrators to be held accountable, such 
as in cases where they number in the tens of thousands, the new international legal 
order insists that those bearing the greatest responsibility for the most serious crimes 
be tried for their crimes, lest international law be undermined and peace and security 
threatened. 
 
6. Although international law generally establishes rights and duties between and among 
States, international criminal law imposes obligations not only on States, but also 
makes individuals liable to criminal sanction. International criminal law imposes 
individual and superior responsibility upon persons found guilty of the most serious 
international crimes, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, 
torture, and slavery. As the Statutes for the ICTY, ICTR, ICC, and SCSL make clear, 
certain crimes of exceptional gravity—including war crimes and crimes against 
humanity—both shock the conscience of humankind and threaten the public order.  
 
7. Atrocities and mass crimes were prevalent throughout the twentieth century, 
prompting repeated endeavors of the community of States to prohibit and prosecute 
the most egregious international crimes, including war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and genocide. Protections against these crimes are amongst those which 
have risen to the level of peremptory norms of international law, jus cogens norms, 
which are “accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a 
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted.”4 The fundamental nature of 
these norms in turn gives rise to obligations erga omnes, “obligations of a State 
towards the international community as a whole.”5 Violations of jus cogens norms 
create an obligation on all States to redress the violations. 
 
8. When there is credible evidence to suggest that individuals have committed war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, they may be subject to prosecution by 
the courts at national level, by the State of residence or citizenship, or by other States 
acting on the basis of an internationally recognized form of jurisdiction, such as, for 
example passive personality jurisdiction or universal jurisdiction. 6 Individuals may be 
also subject to prosecution by an international, regional, or hybrid court or tribunal 
that has jurisdiction over the crimes.  
 
9. International crimes are increasingly being prosecuted under the principle of universal 
jurisdiction. Developed in the nineteenth century to deal with crimes such as piracy 
and slavery, universal jurisdiction applies today to additional crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole, including genocide, war crimes and crimes 
                                                 
4 See e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 53; Bassiouni 
(1999), at 210-217. 
5 Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain, Second 
Phase, Judgment (5 February 1970), 1970 I.C.J. 3, para. 33. See also Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public 
International Law, 5th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998) at 568; and Giorgio Gaya, “Obligations Erga Omnes, 
International Crimes and Jus Cogens: A Tentative Analysis of Three Related Concepts” in Joseph H.H. 
Weiler, Antonio Cassese & Marina Spinedi, eds., International Crimes of State: A Critical Analysis of the 
ILC's Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1989) at 151. 
6 See e.g., S. R. Ratner & J.S. Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law 
(1997), at 133-161. 
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against humanity. 7 Universal crimes, particularly jus cogens violations, are 
considered so heinous that States have obligations to ensure they are punished: the 
principle aut dedere aut judicare—either surrender or prosecute—applies. This 
principle provides that a State must either extradite a suspect for trial before a 
national, regional, or international/ized court, or bring the suspect to justice before its 
own courts.8  
    
10. The obligation to prosecute or surrender persons accused of serious violations of 
international criminal law is rooted both in treaty obligations and customary 
international law. The Preamble to the Rome Statute, for example, to which Nigeria is 
a party, emphasizes that “it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal 
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.”  
 
11. Treaties which also incorporate this principle include the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
and the UN Convention against Torture.9 When there is credible evidence that crimes 
encompassed by these instruments have been committed, State Parties to these 
treaties, such as Nigeria, are specifically obligated to search for, prosecute, and 
punish persons suspected of torture, or of committing grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions. This obligation has also been interpreted to mean that under no 
circumstances can States grant immunity or amnesty from prosecution. 10  
 
12. A decade and more ago, legal scholars argued that in addition to specific treaty 
obligations, a norm had developed at customary international law which both requires 
prosecution of the perpetrators of the most serious international law crimes and 
prohibits the granting of amnesty to such persons.11 Those obligations are 
increasingly solidified in practice, as demonstrated by the proliferation of 
international and hybrid tribunals which are holding leaders responsible for such 
atrocities as war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, torture, and enslavement. 
Further, there is increasing willingness among States to apply the principle of 
universal jurisdiction in their own national courts to prosecute violations of 
international criminal law.  
 
13. The United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly affirmed the obligation to 
prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity—or to extradite alleged 
                                                 
7 See the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, arts. 8 and 9, ILA, Report of 
the 48th Session, UN Doc. A/51/10, at para. 50. 
8 See generally M. C. Bassiouni & E. M. Wise, Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to Extradite or 
Prosecute in International Law (1995).  
9 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. 
Resolution. 39/46, [annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984)], entered into 
force June 26, 1987, [hereafter Convention against Torture] art. 5 (2). Nigeria ratified the Convention 
against Torture in June 2001.  The duty to extradite or prosecute persons alleged to have committed 
offences prohibited under the Convention against Torture is stated in absolute terms under Article 7.: “The 
State Party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have committed any offence 
referred to in article 4 is found shall in the cases contemplated in article 5, if it does not extradite him, 
submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution”. 
10 See Theodor Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (Oxford University 
Press, 1989).  
11 See, for example , Roht-Arriaza (1995), supra . 
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offenders.12 More recently, the UN Secretary-General, in his August 2004 report on 
the rule of law and transitional justice, emphasized that experience demonstrates that 
lasting peace and stability cannot be achieved without recourse to redress and 
justice.13 He also recognized that international standards require that amnesty cannot 
be promised for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, or gross violations of 
human rights, even to secure a peace agreement and end a conflict.14 Noting the 
international shift from impunity and amnesty “towards the creation of an 
international rule of law”, he emphasized that “[d]espite their limitations and 
imperfections, international and hybrid criminal tribunals have changed the character 
of international justice and enhanced the global character of the rule of law.”15 
 
14. Within the African lega l context, scholars have been adamant in emphasizing the 
existence of a customary international law duty to prosecute those suspected of 
having committed serious international crimes. The Cairo Guiding Principles on 
Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human Rights Offences: An African 
Perspective, developed by a group of African jurists, make this explicit: 
 
The absence of specific enabling domestic legislation does not relieve any State of 
its international legal obligation to prosecute, extradite, surrender or transfer 
suspects to any State or international tribunal willing and able to prosecute such 
suspects. (2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States, as 
enshrined in Article 4(g) but qualified by Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of 
the African Union, shall be interpreted in light of the well established and 
generally accepted principle that gross human rights offences are of legitimate 
concern to the international community, and give rise to prosecution under the 
principle of universal jurisdiction. 16 
 
15. Nigeria has not only ratified the Geneva Conventions, it has also enacted domestic 
legislation specifically incorporating them into its domestic law and recognizing 
universal jurisdiction over grave breaches.17  
                                                 
12 See also Declaration on Territorial Asylum, GA res 2312 (XXII) (1967); Resolution on the Question of 
the Punishment of War Criminals and of Persons who have Committed Crimes against Humanity, GA res. 
2712 (XXV) (1970); Principles of International Co-operation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition, and 
Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, GA res 3074 (XXVIII) 
(1973); Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary 
Executions, recommended by the Economic and Social Council Resolution 1989/65 of 24 May 1989; 
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons Fro m Enforced Disappearances, GA res 47/133, U.N, Doc no. 
A/RES/47/133 (1992). 
13 Report of the Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict 
Societies, UN Doc. S/2004/616, 3 Aug. 2004, para. 2. 
14 Report of the Secretary-General, at paras. 10 and 32. 
15 Report of the Secretary-General, at para. 40. 
16 Africa Legal Aid, “African Perspectives on Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes, Report of the 
Experts Meeting,” Cairo, Egypt, 30-31 July 2001. The Principles were cited in the Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Van de Wyngaert in the Case concerning the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic 
of Congo v. Belgium) Judgement of 14 February 2002. 
17 See the Geneva Conventions Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990, ch. 162, sect. 3 (1)-(2) 
(formerly the Geneva Conventions Ordinance, 1960). Prior to this law, the United Kingdom's Geneva 
Conventions Act 1957 applied to Nigeria under the UK's Geneva Conventions Act (Colonial Territories) 
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16. There is every indication that Charles Taylor has not only committed serious crimes 
in Sierra Leone, he is also responsible for crimes in Liberia, and his freedom in 
Nigeria threatens peace, security, economic viability, and the rule of law in the entire 
West African region. 18 
  
17. Charles Taylor has been indicted by the Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone and charged with crimes against humanity and war crimes under Articles 2, 3 
and 4 of the Statute of the Special Court.19 These crimes invoke international criminal 
responsibility, are jus cogens violations and are considered amongst the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. There is credible 
evidence to suggest that he is responsible for these crimes. To allow him to escape 
justice would undermine legal norms, be in violation of Nigeria’s obligations, and set 
a precedent that Nigeria willingly provides a safe haven to persons accused of 
atrocities. Nigeria has a duty to either prosecute Charles Taylor or extradite him to a 
relevant authority, notably to the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which has indicted 
him for war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
 
B. There is a Duty Upon States to Deny Refuge to Alleged Perpetrators of the 
Most Serious International Crimes 
 
18. The underlying objective of international criminal law—to provide legal obligations 
and remedies that thwart impunity for the most serious crimes—also includes the 
obligation to deny refuge to those who have committed serious breaches of 
international criminal law.20 This requirement is given most explicit expression in the 
concept of exclusion in international refugee law: individuals in respect of whom 
there are serious reasons for considering that they have committed grave crimes 
cannot be recognized as refugees and cannot benefit from the protection of the 
international refugee protection regime. Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees specifically provides: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Order in Council, 1959, providing national courts with universal jurisdiction over grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions. 
18 See e.g., SC Res. 1478 (6 May 2003); SC Res. 1532 (12 March 2004); Taylor’s fate critical to lasting 
peace, The Nation, 24 July 2003; Taylor’s shadow looms over Liberia as Nigeria issues warning, AFP, 13 
Oct. 2003; Edith Lederer, UN says Taylor should be brought to justice, United Nations, 16 Sept. 2004. 
19 Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Indictment, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Case No. SCSL-
2003-01-I (7 March 2003), paras. 32-59. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, January 16, 2002, 
available online at http://www.sierra-leone.org/specialcourtstatute.html. Articles 3 and 4 of the Special 
Court’s Statute confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon the Special Court with respect to a limited set of war 
crimes: violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Protocol II (Article 3) as well as 
other serious violations of international humanitarian law (Article 4). The remaining serious violations of 
international humanitarian law listed in Article 4 of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone are 
recognized as violations of customary international law. They also violate conventional law applicable in 
Sierra Leone and Nigeria.  
20 See generally, Chaloka Beyani, Joan Fitzpatrick, Walter Kälin and Monette Zard, guest editors, 
“Exclusion from Protection: Article 1F of the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention and Article I(5) of 
the 1969 OAU Convention in the Context of Armed Conflict, Genocide and Restrictionism,” International 
Journal of Refugee Law 12, Special Supplementary Issue (Winter 2000) [hereafter IJRL Special Issue].  
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The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect 
to whom there are serious reasons for considering that: 
 
a) He has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime 
against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up 
to make provision in respect of such crimes; 
 
b) He has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of 
refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee; 
 
c) He has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of 
the United Nations. 21 
 
19. In Africa, the exclusion clauses have been given particular regional expression in the 
1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa.22 Article I (5) of that Convention tracks the provisions of Article 1F exactly, 
with two exceptions. First, the 1969 OAU Convention exclusion clause directs that it 
is “the country of asylum” which has the responsibility to determine the existence of 
“serious reasons for considering” a finding of excludability. Second, an additional 
provision, Article I 5 (c), stipulates a fourth category of excludable individual—one 
who “has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
Organization of African Unity.”23 In Nigeria, the Refugees Commission Decree of 
1989 incorporates the core content of the exclusion clauses of both the 1969 OAU 
and 1951 UN Conventions.24 
 
20. The mechanism of exclusion can be viewed as a permanent valve which mediates 
between two critical goals of the international community: the obligation to protect 
those threatened with serious human rights violations and the requirement to combat 
the impunity of the authors of such violations. Serving as a reminder that criminals 
may not be unjustly sheltered, the institution of exclusion triggers a State’s obligation 
                                                 
21 The 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, entered into 
force 22 April 1954. [hereafter “the 1951 UN Convention”]. As of 1 August 2004, 142 States were parties 
to the Convention, including Nigeria, which deposited its instrument of accession on 23 October 1967. The 
UNHCR Statute also contains parallel restrictions on the scope of the application of UNHCR’s mandate. 
Paragraph 7 (d) provides that the competence of the High Commissioner shall not extend to a person in 
“respect of whom there are serious reasons for considering that he has committed a crime covered by the 
provisions of treaties of extradition of a crime mentioned in article VI of the 1945 London Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal or by the provisions of article 14, paragraph 2, of the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights,” Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, GA Resolution. 428 (V), annex, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 46, U.N. Doc A/1775 (1950) of 
14 December 1950.  
22 The 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, entered into force 20 June 1974 [hereafter the “1969 OAU 
Convention”].  
23 References hereafter to the scope of art. 1 F of the 1951 Geneva Convention are to be understood also to 
apply to art. I 5 of the 1969 OAU Convention.  
24 National Commission for Refugees, etc. Decree 1989, Official Gazette, No. 75, vol 76, 29 December 
1989, Section 20. 
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to search out those who have committed the most serious crimes and ensure that they 
are held accountable for their actions.  
 
21. In considering the formulation of the concept of exclusion during the drafting of the 
1951 UN Convention, 25 States took the view that “fugitives from justice—including 
both those whose serious unpunished criminal conduct would bring refugee law into 
disrepute and [those] who would use refugee status to avoid lawful extradition—were 
inherently unworthy of refugee status.”26 The requirement to exclude from refugee 
status is thus set out in peremptory terms in the both the 1951 UN and 1969 OAU 
Conventions: “the provisions of this Convention shall not apply” to persons who 
come within the ambit of exclusion. The Nigerian Refugees Commission Decree is 
similarly categorical: “a person shall not be considered a refugee under this Decree if 
exclusion applies.”27 As Hathaway clarifies, “[a]lthough a government may invoke its 
sovereignty to admit a person described in Article 1F to its territory, it is absolutely 
barred from granting Convention refugee status to that person.”28 In fact, a proposal 
from the United States to leave the question of exclusion as a matter of State 
discretion was explicitly rejected during the drafting process. Delegates objected, 
inter alia, to the “disturbing moral consequences” of such an approach. 29 
 
22. Exclusion under Article 1F of the 1951 Convention therefore “requires governments 
to deny refugee status to any person reasonably regarded as either an international 
criminal or a fugitive from domestic criminal justice.”30 The drafters of the 1951 
Convention thus intended to ensure that those who committed serious crimes would 
not escape prosecution—that refugee status should not function as a refuge for 
criminals. Due to the infant state of the institutions and mechanisms of international 
criminal justice at the time of the drafting, however, many States were not equipped 
to prosecute all of the crimes covered by the exclusion clauses. Facilitation of 
extradition was one of the ways by which States could strive to ensure that 
accountability was pursued.31 Leading commentators Hathaway and Harvey suggest 
that, as a result, exclusion can be said to be “predicated on the satisfaction of an 
external and clearly defined standard of international or extraditable criminality.”32 
 
23. Today, the content and institutions of international criminal responsibility have 
evolved to include expanded provision for both permissive and mandatory 
jurisdiction and more responsive mechanisms facilitating and governing extradition. 
This provides a new context within which the exclusion clauses may operate fully 
                                                 
25 The travaux préparatoires of the 1951 Convention can be found at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/home?page=PROTECT&id=3c0762ea4. 
26 J.C. Hathaway and C.J. Harvey, “Framing Refugee Protection in the New World Disorder,” Cornell 
International Law Journal 34 (2001) [hereafter “Framing Refugee Protection”] at 273.  
27 National Commission for Refugees, etc. Decree 1989, Official Gazette, No. 75, vol 76, 29 December 
1989, Section 20 (2). 
28 “Framing Refugee Protection”, supra, at 263. 
29 UN ad hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, 18th mtg, UN Doc. E/AC/.32/SR.17 at 3. 
30 “Framing Refugee Protection” supra, at 259. 
31 “Framing Refugee Protection” supra, at 277.  
32 “Framing Refugee Protection” supra, at 259. 
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effectively—to identify and differentiate those persons needing protection from those 
needing to be held accountable for their crimes.  
 
The crimes encompassed by the exclusion clauses 
 
24. The exclusion clauses do not enumerate precisely the acts that may render a person 
“undeserving” of refugee status. Guidance on the definition of crimes referred to in 
the exclusion clauses and the assignation of criminal responsibility for those crimes 
must be found outside refugee law—in the evolving body of international criminal 
law.33 Charles Taylor has been indicted by the Special Court for crimes including 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity, crimes 
which are unequivocally within the ambit of Article 1F (a). Other crimes may be 
considered as “non-political” ordinary crimes, including, for example, isolated acts of 
torture not found to be part of a systematic attack (Article 1F (b)). Finally, there are 
allegations that Charles Taylor may be responsible for crimes referred to as “contrary 
to the purposes and principles” of the United Nations and the Organisation of African 
Unity, envisaged in Article 1F (c) and Article I 5 (c) and (d) of the UN and OAU 
Refugee Conventions respectively.34 
 
25. An additional factor must be noted. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
in the United States, the international community has imposed ever more stringent 
measures aimed at combating “terrorist” acts. The suggestion that terrorists might 
avail themselves of protection through the international refugee regime is viewed with 
particular opprobrium.35 The result has been a series of authoritative declarations by 
the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations 
emphasizing the mandatory nature of exclusion in certain circumstances. On 
September 28, 2001, for example, the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, 
called upon all States to “take appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant 
provisions of national and international law, including international standards of 
human rights, before granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that the 
asylum seeker has not planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of 
terrorist acts”.36 Follow up resolutions and related legislative initiatives have 
reiterated this obligation. 37 
                                                 
33 See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Refugees, Rebels and the Quest for Justice (2002) at 129- 
146. 
34 See Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, entered into 
force 24 Oct. 1945, chap. 1, art. 1-2 and Charter of the Organization of African Unity, 479 U.N.T.S. 39, 
entered into force 13 Sept. 1963, arts. II-III). Both the nature of the indictment charging Taylor with war 
crimes and crimes against humanity and other information readily available in the public domain suggest 
this possibility.  
35 UNHCR shares “the legitimate concern of States” that there be “no avenue for those supporting or 
committing terrorist acts to secure access to territory, whether to find a safe haven, avoid prosecution or to 
carry out further attacks.” UNHCR, “Addressing Security Concerns Without Undermining Refugee 
Protection,” November 2001. See also General Assembly Resolution 210, UN GAOR 51st Session Agenda 
Item 151, UN Doc. A/Res/51/210 (1997) inviting States to “take appropriate measures […] before granting 
asylum, for the purposes of ensuring that the asylum seeker has not participated in terrorist acts”. 
36 Security Council Resolution No. 1373, UN Doc. S/Res/1373 (2001), 28 Sept. 2001 at para. 3 (f). 
37 See, for example, Security Council Resolution 1456 of 20 January 2003 and the Draft Comprehensive 
Convention on International Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/55/1. 
  11
 
26. Although an accusation that an applicant has committed acts of “terrorism” cannot as 
such lend itself to being used as a separate ground for exclusion (given the lack of 
consensus within the international community as to its exact definition and 
constituent elements)38 acts considered “terrorist” can be encompassed within the 
exclusion clauses. The OAU Convention on the Combating and Preventing of 
Terrorism, for example, to which Nigeria is a party, defines terrorism inter alia as, 
“any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may 
endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, 
any person, any number or group of persons or cause or may cause damage to public 
or private property […] and is calculated or intended to: […] (iii) create general 
insurrection in a State.” The definition also includes “any promotion, sponsoring, 
contribution to, command, aid incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, 
organising or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act referred 
to.”39 A number of the counts referred to in the indictment of Charles Taylor are 
amenable to consideration within this rubric. In addition, there have been allegations 
that Taylor harbored and supported al Qaeda operations prior to, and post, the 
September 11 bombings in the United States.40 It is important to bear in mind, 
however, that the highest standards and procedures must be adhered to in assessing 
crimes designated as “terrorist” for purposes of the application of the exclusion clause 
Article 1 F (b). Instruments which purport to automatically depoliticize certain acts, 
for example, should be approached with caution. 
 
Determining individual criminal responsibility 
 
27. There are clear principles and criteria of procedural fairness which apply when a legal 
determination concerning the rights or interests of an individual is under 
contemplation. 41 The risk of exposure to serious harm that may result from a decision 
to exclude demands that it be taken in accordance with the strictest procedural 
safeguards.42 Key elements of this requirement include the right to be heard in person 
and the right to an appeal of a decision to exc lude.  
                                                 
38Although there is no internationally accepted legal definition of terrorism as yet, as of the end of 2001 
there were no fewer than 19 global and regional treaties which dealt with various acts of terrorism. For a 
full list of international legal instruments related to the prevention and suppression of terroris m see General 
Assembly, Sixth Committee Information UN Doc. A/56/160 at sec. III. 
39 OAU Terrorism Convention, supra at art.1 3. (a) and (b). 
40 See for example, Bryan Bender, “Liberia’s Taylor Gave Aid to Qaeda, UN Probe Finds,” Boston Globe 4 
August 2004. See also Edward Harris, “Al-Qaeda Bomb Suspects Hid in Liberia,” Associated Press, 1 June 
2004. 
41 For an extensive discussion of procedural rights in the application of the exclusion clause see Michael 
Bliss, “‘Serious Reasons for Considering’: Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness in the Application 
of the Article 1F Exclusion Clauses,” in IJRL Special Issue, supra . See also UNHCR, Guidelines on 
International Protection: Application of the Exclusion Clauses – Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating 
to the status of refugees, UNHCR Doc. No. HCR/GIP/03/05 (4 September 2003). 
42 As UNHCR has declared “given the possible serious consequences of exclusion, it is important to apply 
them with great caution and only after a full assessment of the individual circumstances of the case. The 
exclusion clauses should, therefore, always be interpreted in a restrictive manner”, Background Note on the 
Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, Protection Policy and Legal Advice Section, Department of International Protection, Geneva, 04 
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28. For the exclusion clauses to apply all elements required to constitute the particular 
alleged crime must be present. This includes not only the objective elements of such 
crimes but also the subjective elements: the personal circumstances pertaining to the 
perpetrator which determine whether he or she incurred criminal responsibility. 43 In 
assessing responsibility it is important to recall that the exclusion clauses encompass 
both international crimes and non- international crimes.44  
 
29. International criminal law gives rise to individual and superior responsibility for, 
among other crimes, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations 
of the laws or customs of war, crimes against humanity, genocide and crimes against 
peace.45 It is not solely direct, personal commission of the acts alleged which incur 
international criminal responsibility, as superiors and others facilitating or 
orchestrating crimes may also be held accountable. The indictment against Charles 
Taylor charges inter alia that prohibited acts were carried out in furtherance of “a 
joint criminal enterprise in which the accused participated or were a reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of the joint criminal enterprise in which the accused 
participated.”46 Article 6(1) of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
specifically provides that: “A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or 
otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime […] 
shall be individually responsible for the crime.”47 It has long been recognized that 
international criminal responsibility includes participation in a joint criminal 
enterprise.48  
 
30. In its provisions on criminal responsibility, the Rome Statute of the ICC also recognizes 
the concepts of conspiracy, facilitation, aiding and abetting, encouraging, inciting, 
furthering, contributing to, participating in a common purpose and attempting to commit 
a justiciable crime.49 Recent jurisprudence established in the ICTR and ICTY provides 
guidance on interpreting the scope of these forms of individual and superior 
                                                                                                                                                 
September 2003, at International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 15, No. 3, [hereafter “Background Note”] 
at para. 2. 
43 See ICC Statute, supra , arts. 25 and 30. 
44 While the scope of criminal responsibility set out in Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute is usually 
appropriate in the application of Articles 1F(a) and 1F(c) in the absence of clear international standards 
describing criminal responsibility for serious non-political crimes, it has been suggested that this might also 
be the appropriate standard in the application of Article 1F(b). See recommendations of Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights (2002), supra , at 141.  
45 Nuremberg Charter, supra , art. 6 (a), (b) and (c) respectively. ”Crimes against peace” are now more 
commonly referred to as ”the crime of aggression.” Genocide, originally encompassed by “crimes against 
humanity,” was given recognition as an independent crime by the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
46 Indictment, The Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Special Court for Sierra Leone , Case No. SCSL-
03-I, 7 March 2003, at para. 26.  
47 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra . 
48 See especially ICTY Tadic Appeals Chamber Judgment of 15 July 1999, IT-94-1, and ICTY Kvoèka et 
al. Trial Chamber Judgment of 2 Nov. 2001, IT-98-30/1, which cite Nuremberg precedent. 
49 See ICC Statute, art. 25(3), supra . See also Statute of the ICTY, supra , art.6 (1); Statute of the ICTR, 
supra , art. 7(1). Both the ICTY and the ICTR have the power to prosecute those who planned, instigated, 
ordered, or otherwise aided and abetted the planning, preparation, or execution of crimes under their respective 
jurisdictions. See also the recent ICTY Stakic Trial Chamber Judgement, IT-97-24, 31 July 2003. 
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responsibility. The categories of instigation, commission, aiding and abetting and 
participation in a joint criminal enterprise were elaborated on extensively in the ICTY 
case of Kvoèka et al. (Omarska and Keraterm camps).50  
 
31. Command (or superior) responsibility is one of the forms of criminal responsibility 
frequently applicable to military or political leaders and is included in the current 
SCSL indictment against Charles Taylor.51 Its scope is described authoritatively in 
Article 28 of the Rome Statute.52 It should be emphasized that persons may be 
determined responsible in this respect on account of their inaction, i.e., if they fail in 
their duty to ensure the lawful conduct of their subordinates. As in a criminal trial, in 
determining whether or not the asylum seeker is excludable, the decision-making 
authority must permit Charles Taylor to present evidence demonstrating his 
innocence. 
 
Standards and burden of proof 
 
32. Despite its critical international criminal law content, applying the exclusion clauses 
does not require a criminal trial: its application is not predicated on a definitive 
finding that the asylum seeker has been found guilty of the crimes in question. The 
standard stipulated both in the 1951 UN and 1969 OAU Conventions and indeed in 
the Nigerian Commission for Refugees Decree 1989 is that there are “serious reasons 
for considering” the individual responsible.53 Although “serious reasons for 
considering” is not a familiar standard in most legal systems and does not in itself 
provide a clear and precise test,54 recent authoritative surveys of comparative 
jurisprudence have identified the standard as lower than the common law criminal 
standard of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt,” but higher than the civil law “balance 
of probabilities” standard.55 UNHCR describes the test thus: “clear and credible 
                                                 
50 Kvoèka Trial Chamber Judgement, supra .  
51 Indictment, The Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Special Court for Sierra Leone , Case No. SCSL-
03-I, 7 March 2003, at para. 27. 
52 See also the Statute of the ICTY, supra , art. 7; Statute of the ICTR, supra , art. 6(3); ICTY Blaškiæ  Trial 
Chamber Judgement, IT-95-14-T, 3 March 2000; ICTY Èelebiæi Appeals Chamber Judgement, IT- 96-21, 
21 Feb. 2001. 
53 This is the standard stipulated in Section 20 (2) (a) of the 1989 Decree.  
54 An examination of State practice shows that a variety of standards have been employed in different 
jurisdictions. The Federal Court of Appeal in Canada, for example, has held that “serious reasons for 
considering” indicates “a lower standard of proof than the balance of probabilities.” (Ramirez v. Canada 
[1992] 2.F.C. 306, 311-313). A number of subsequent decisions have followed this approach. “[C]lear and 
convincing evidence” was the formulation used, however, in a more recent case. (Cardenas v. Canada, 23 
Immigration Law Review 92d, 244 (1994), at 252). The UK Court of Appeal has concluded that it is 
sufficient that “the evidence point[s] strongly to […] guilt.” T. v. Secretary of State for Home Department, 
Court of Appeal, [1995] Immigration Appeals Reports 142. In the U.S., a much lower standard has been 
employed when examining analogous asylum bars. The “probable cause” test has been interpreted as 
requiring “good reason to believe.” Jiminez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d. 547, 562 (5th Cir 1962) (quoting U.S. 
v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 2, 12 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 1469a)).  
55 See Background Note, supra . The recently agreed EU minimum standards on qualification for refugee 
status also employ the standard “serious reasons for considering.” See Proposal for a Council Directive on 
minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals and stateless persons as 
refuges or as person who otherwise need protection, 31 March 2004, 2001/0207 (CNS) available at 
http://www.ecre.org/eu_developments/status/Asile%2021_30%20March_31%20March%202004.pdf 
  14
evidence of involvement in excludable acts is required to satisfy the ‘serious reasons’ 
test.”56  
 
33. The establishment of the factual basis for an exclusion decis ion, or the evidence 
required to meet the “serious reasons” standard can be constituted by a wide variety of 
information, including the existence of an indictment by an international tribunal, a 
final decision by a national court reached after a fair trial, credible admissions by the 
applicant and clear and convincing information. 57 
 
34. Information that a person is the subject of an indictment, charge or proceeding or 
conviction before an international tribunal for an excludable crime—as is at issue in 
the instant case—should be considered to constitute “clear and convincing reasons” 
for exclusion when that evidence is credible. As UNHCR has noted “given the 
rigorous manner in which indictments are put together by international criminal 
tribunals […] indictments by such bodies […] satisfies the standard of proof required 
by Article 1F.”58 During the screenings of Rwandans in the aftermath of the Rwandan 
genocide, for example, an indictment issued by the Rwanda Tribunal was considered 
to constitute sufficient grounds for exclusion from refugee status under UNHCR 
Guidelines.  
 
35. Charles Taylor has been indicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone. The standard 
of indictment before the Special Court is in fact higher than that of the ICTR and 
ICTY: before the Prosecutor can present a case for indictment before the Special 
Court he must be “satisfied in the course of an investigation that a suspect has 
committed a crime, or crimes within the jurisdiction of the Special Court.”59 In view 
of the strict standard of this ind ictment by the SCSL, it is submitted that in the case of 
Charles Taylor, the threshold for a finding of “serious reasons” with respect to the 
crimes stipulated has been reached and that he is presumptively subject to exclusion. 
 
36. As noted above, however, the existence of an indictment is not the only basis upon 
which the application of the exclusion clauses can be founded. In the case of Charles 
Taylor, a vast repertoire of documentation alleging his involvement in a variety of 
serious crimes exists with int er-governmental, governmental and non-governmental 
sources.60 The activities of the Liberian government, while Charles Taylor headed it, 
                                                 
56 See Background Note, supra , at para 108. 
57 ”Ensuring a Fair Procedure: The Findings of the Legal Advisory Group” in Lawyers Committee for 
Human Rights (2002) , supra, at 147-186.  
58 Background Note, supra , at para 107. 
59 Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Under the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence of both the ICTY and ICTR, the “Prosecutor, if satisfied in the course of an 
investigation that there is sufficient evidence to provide reasonable grounds for believing that a suspect has 
committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal” may present a case for indictment. (Rule 47B of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, rev. 32, of the ICTY 12 August 2004, available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/ and Rule 47B of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTR, 
available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/rules/260600/. 
60 See e.g., Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1306 
(2000), Paragraph 19 in Relation to Sierra Leone, available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/panelreport.html  
.  
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attracted the condemnation of the UN Security Council in 2001, which declared that 
Liberian support for the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone 
constituted a “threat to peace and security.”61 Even in the absence of the outstanding 
indictments of the Special Court, there is ample evidence that Charles Taylor has 
incurred responsibility for serious crimes, which raises the question of the application 
of the exclusion clause. 
 
37. Although in asylum procedures the burden of proof is generally shared between the 
asylum determining body and the applicant, where the application of the exclusion 
clauses is at issue, the burden of proof shifts to the State. There are certain cases, 
however, where a rebuttable presumption of excludability may arise, and the situation 
of Charles Taylor is a case in point. Although automatic exclusion of persons purely 
on the basis of their senior position in a government is not permitted, “a presumption 
of individual responsibility reversing the burden of proof may arise as a result of a 
senior person’s continued membership of a government (or part of it) clearly engaged 
in activities that fall within the scope of Article 1F.”62 As UNHCR advises, “[t]his 
would be the case for example, where the government concerned has faced 
international condemnation (in particular from the UN Commission on Human Rights 
or the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights) for gross or 
systematic human rights abuses.”63 UNHCR guidelines further suggest that the 
standard of proof required for a challenge to a rebuttable presumption is “a plausible 
explanation regarding non- involvement or disassociation from any excludable acts, 
coupled with an absence of serious evidence to the contrary.”64  
 
38. Where an indictment has been issued by an international or hybrid tribunal, it may be 
preferable in some cases for the determination process to be suspended and the 
individual turned over to the relevant prosecuting authority. If the asylum seeker is 
acquitted, she or he may then pursue a claim for protection as a refugee. In Tanzania, 
for example, during the screenings of the Rwandan caseload carried out in 1997, the 
position was that any asylum seeker or refugee who was indicted by the Tribunal 
would be handed over to the authorities in Arusha.65 Although indictment by the 
Tribunal was not considered in itself determinative of status, if an indicted person was 
eventually cleared by the Tribunal, his or her refugee status would be respected by the 
government of Tanzania (barring any other obstacles to recognition). The option of 
transferring Charles Taylor for trial to the Special Court for Sierra Leone, prior to 
final determination of his status, is available to the Government of Nigeria. If found 
not guilty, he may return to Nigeria and seek legitimate asylum. 
 
39. Even following a positive determination of status, cancellation of refugee status is 
required if it is subsequently found that the exclusion clauses applied at the time that 
                                                 
61 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001). 
62 Background Note, supra , at para 58. 
63 Background Note, supra , at para 58. 
64 Background Note, supra , at para 110. 
65 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (2002) , supra , at 28-33. 
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the decision was made.66 As the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status makes clear, “facts justifying exclusion [may] become 
known only after a person has been recognized as a refugee. In such cases the 
exclusion clause will call for a cancellation of the decision previously taken.”67 In 
particular, as UNHCR has noted “[i]nformation which comes to light during the 
extradition process may also set in motion proceedings leading to the revocation of 
the status of a recognized refugee.”68  
 
40. In December 2003, Interpol issued a “red notice” regarding Charles Taylor. Although 
not itself an arrest warrant, the “red notice” was based on the Special Court 
indictment against Charles Taylor and forms the basis for a decision by the Nigerian 
authorities on whether or not to authorize provisional arrest. At a minimum, the notice 
indicates the necessity for review of the status granted him in Nigeria.69  
 
Immunities 
 
41. The increasing attention being paid to the application of international criminal law to 
individuals acting—or purporting to act—in an official capacity has raised the 
question whether such individuals should ever, and under what circumstances, be 
shielded from arrest and prosecution by doctrines of immunity. The doctrine of Head 
of State immunity is largely a matter of custom.70 In 1945, the immunity rules were 
revised for purposes of determining the individual criminal responsibility of officials 
in proceedings before international tribunals. Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter 
declared that “[t]he official position of the defendants, whether as Heads of State or 
responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing 
them from responsibility or mitigating punishment.”71 Likewise, the Statute of the 
                                                 
66 See more generally, Sibylle Kapferer, “Cancellation of Refugee Status,” UNHCR Department of 
International Protection, March 2003. 
67 Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining 
Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 
(Geneva: January 1992) at para 141. 
68 Sibylle Kapferer, “The Interface between Extradition and Asylum,” UNHCR, Legal and Protection 
Policy Research Series, November 2003, para 213. 
69 See, for example, the ECOWAS Convention on Extradition (1994) at art. 22 (3) which 
specifically provides that a request for provisional arrest may be made by a requesting State through 
Interpol. 
70 While the immunity of diplomats has always been regulated by its own regime, the immunity of Heads of 
State appears to have been subsumed within State immunities until relatively recently, owing to the 
identification of the State with its ruler. See generally Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the 
International Criminal Court (2004) 98 A.J.I.L. 407; Jürgen Bröhmer, State Immunity and the Violation of 
Human Rights (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997); Sir Arthur Watts, “The Legal Position in International 
Law of Heads of States, Heads of Governments and Foreign Ministers,” 3 Recueil des Cours 9, 35-81. See 
also  Jerrold L. Mallory, “Resolving the Confusion Over Head of State Immunity: The Defined Right of 
Kings,” 86 Columbia L. Rev . 169, 177 (1986).  
71 The Nure mberg Tribunal declared that "[t]he principle of international law, which under certain 
circumstances, protects the representative of a state, cannot be applied to acts which are condemned as 
criminal by international law." Nuremberg Judgment, supra , at 223. Similar formulations followed in other 
instruments, for example the Genocide Convention states that “Persons committing genocide or any of the 
other acts enumerated in art. III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, 
public officials or private individuals”.  
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International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, art. 7(2), stipulates: “The 
official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as 
a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal 
responsibility nor mitigate punishment.”72 In keeping with these developments, 
Article 27 of the Rome Statute similarly holds that norms of responsibility apply 
without any distinction based on official capacity. 73  
 
42. Further State practice and doctrinal development are needed before a straightforward 
consensus can emerge with respect to all aspects of procedure in this area.74 Where 
international tribunals are not involved, the immunities rationae personae of Heads 
of State and Heads of Government who are still in office continue to enjoy support 
from States as a necessary component of inter-State relations.75 This stands in 
distinction to the situation of former Heads of State facing domestic courts, where  
the development concerning immunities is less consistent.76  
                                                 
72 The Statute of the Rwanda Tribunal, art. 6(2), is identical. The ICTY indicted Slobodan Milosevic while 
in office as President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Prosecutor v. Milosevic et al., Indictment, 
ICTY Case No. IT-99-37, (24 May 1999). The ICTR convicted Jean Kambanda, Interim Prime Minister of 
Rwanda during the 1994 conflict, for crimes committed during his time in office, citing the abuse of his 
official position as an aggravating factor in sentencing. ICTR Kambanda Judgment and Sentence, ICTR- 
97-23-S, para. 61(B)(vii) (4 Sept. 1998). The ICTY has declared art. 7(2) of the ICTY Statute and art. 6(2) 
of the ICTR Statute to be "indisputably declaratory of customary international law": ICTY Furundžija Trial 
Chamber Judgment, IT-95-17/1, para. 140, 10 December 1998. 
73 Rome Statute, supra , art. 27. Article 6(2) of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone similarly 
provides: “The official position of any accused persons, whether as Head of State or Government or as a 
responsible government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate 
punishment.” 
74 See Otto Triffterer, commentary on Art. 27, in O.Triffterer and C. Rosbaud, eds. The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, (2000), at 501. 
75 The absolute immunity that attaches to the person of a diplomat as a representative of their sending State 
is known as immunity rationae personae, and applies to all acts performed during tenure of the posting, 
regardless of whether performed within the scope or purported scope of the person’s official functions; the 
immunity enjoyed by a Head of State at customary international law during their tenure in office is 
generally recognised to be of the same sort: Hazel Fox, The Pinochet Case No.3  48 I.C.L.Q. 687, 693-69 4 
(1999);. On 13 March 2001, the French Cour de Cassation ruled that Libyan Head of State Mouammar 
Ghadaffi was entitled to immunity from alleged involvement in the terrorist bombing of a civilian aircraft. 
See Salvatore Zappalà, Do Heads of State in Office Enjoy Immunity From Jurisdiction for International 
Crimes? The Ghaddafi Case Before the French Cour de Cassation 12 E.J.I.L. 595 (2001). On 30 October 
2001, a United States court dismissed a suit, alleging torture and other crimes, against the current President 
and Foreign Minister of Zimbabwe, accepting a Suggestion of Immunity from the U.S. Department of 
State. Tachiona et al . v. Mugabe et al., Decision and Order, 31 October 2001 (00 Civ. 6666 [VM ], 
unreported) (U.S. Dist. Ct., S.D.N.Y.). In the definitive proceedings against former Chilean President 
Pinochet, none of the seven judges doubted that the immunity enjoyed by a standing Head of State is 
absolute and applies to acts done in both a private and a public capacity, such that Pinochet would have 
been protected from any legal process before domestic courts (absent a waiver) had he still been Head of 
State at the time the warrant was issued: R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and others, 
ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty International and others intervening)  (No. 3), [1999] 2 All E.R. 97, 111 
(H.L.). See also the decision of the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning the Arrest 
Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, 14 February 2002. 
76 The immunity enjoyed by a diplomat after completion of his or her posting is an immunity attaching only 
to acts performed in an official capacity (i.e. immunity rationae materiae). The same limited immunity is 
increasingly said to apply to a former Head of State at customary international law; thus, jurisdiction has 
been exercised over former Heads of State for acts done in a personal capacity (as, e.g., for personal 
enrichment): See Jennings & Watts (1996), X, at 1037-1044.  
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43. Most importantly for purposes of the present proceedings, it is by now well-
recognized that where the jurisdiction of an internationalized tribunal is engaged there 
is no persuasive ground for upholding immunities of either standing or former Heads 
of State or Government.77 In its decision on the immunity asserted for Charles Taylor, 
the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone stated that: “the sovereign 
equality of states does not prevent a Head of State from being prosecuted before an 
international criminal tribunal or court.”78 The Special Court for Sierra Leone has 
also affirmed that for all relevant purposes it constitutes an international criminal 
tribunal, having been created by agreement of the United Nations with the 
government of Sierra Leone 79 at the request of the United Nations Security Council, 
and having the legal personality and other attributes common to such bodies.80 It has 
international and domestic judges and is adjudicating international crimes of war and 
crimes against humanity.  
 
44. In light of the above and in the circumstances of the present proceedings, no question 
of immunity arises as a result of Charles Taylor’s status as a former Head of State. 
 
Due process for those not recognized as refugees and denied asylum 
 
45. Although persons who come within the ambit of the exclusion clauses continue to be 
entitled to protection of their fundamental human rights, they are considered to be 
“undeserving”  of the special status of refugee because of the egregious nature of their 
past actions.81 Once a person has been excluded from refugee status, therefore, States 
may be viewed as having a twofold duty. They must ensure, as far as possible, that 
persons accused of serious crimes are brought to justice and, at the same time, no 
matter how atrocious the crimes alleged, that they continue to benefit from 
international human rights protection. This would include, for example, an 
opportunity for Charles Taylor to challenge in Nigerian Courts the arrest warrant and 
transfer request of the Special Court. However, in balancing competing interests, 
when States take into account the due process rights of the accused, they must also 
balance these against the due process rights of victims, in order that justice is 
achieved. 
 
46. Although the grant of refugee status is not strictly a bar to prosecution, extradition or 
rendition, as long as the refugee’s rights continue to be protected, a number of States 
                                                 
77 In Pinochet, the only exception to the immunity of a Head of State in office is where an international 
tribunal has been established by an instrument expressly providing for the responsibility of Heads of State. 
See Lords Browne-Wilkinson, Pinochet, at 114, Goff, at 120-121, Hope, at 147, and Phillips, at 189. 
78 Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, Special Court for Sierra 
Leone Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I (31 May 2003), paras. 50-52. 
79 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000), 14 August 2000. 
80 Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I (31 May 2003) , paras. 37-42. 
81 Background Note, supra , at para 21. 
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have made provisions for a prohibition on the extradition of refugees.82 Nigeria is 
among those countries.83 At the same time, because of the scope and egregiousness of 
the charges currently outstanding against Charles Taylor, and the internationalized 
character and status of the body requesting transfer, the very question of rendition in 
these circumstances fulfils the standard for the application of exclusion and the 
revocation of his status. 
 
Asylum and exclusion 
 
47. The right of individuals to “seek and enjoy asylum” is one of the foundations of the 
modern international refugee protection regime.84 Although an individual right to 
“seek and be granted asylum” has not yet been developed clearly in international 
law,85 over the last fifty years the institution of asylum, both as a right of States and as 
a concept with emerging individual human rights elements, has taken on new facets. 
Africa has perhaps developed the most progressive regional approach to asylum, 
recognizing a right for individuals “when persecuted, to seek and obtain asylum in 
other countries in accordance with laws of those countries and international 
conventions.”86 The evolution of modern human rights law and international criminal 
law, both in treaty and in its customary law content, has unequivocally placed certain 
constraints on State freedom to regulate entry and exit of persons to territory, and thus 
by extension on the institution of asylum—e.g., inter alia, the extra-territorial effect 
of the prohibition on torture;87 the jus cogens norm of non-refoulement;88 and the 
obligation to prosecute or extradite those accused of the most serious international 
crimes. 
 
48. The circumscribing effect of exclusion is therefore not limited to the determination of 
refugee status under the auspices of the 1951 U.N. and 1969 OAU Refugee 
Conventions. Exclusion as a concept finds analogous expression in a number of the 
instruments which are facilitating the emerging contours of a right to asylum. Article 
                                                 
82 A number of States have, however, made express provision in national law for the non-extradition of 
refugees. See Sibylle Kapferer, The Interface Between Extradition and Asylum, UNHCR, Legal and 
Protection Policy Research Series, November 2003, at para. 226. 
83 Article 1 (1) of the National Commission for Refugees Decree 1989 provides that, “no person who is a 
refugee within the meaning of this Decree shall be refused entry into Nigeria, expelled, extradited or 
returned in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of any territory” where his life or liberty would be 
threatened. 
84 Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly Resolution 217 A, 10 
December 1948. 
85 During the Charter drafting discussions, for example, a proposal to substitute “to be granted” for “enjoy” 
was opposed strongly by States. See Guy Goodwin Gill, The Refugee in International Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1996) at 175, fn 15. 
86 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 
5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 1986, art. 7(1) [hereafter African Charter] art. 12 (3). 
87 See, inter alia, Convention against Torture, art. 3, supra .  
88 1951 UN Refugee Convention, art. 33. See E Lauterpacht and D Bethlehem, “The scope and content of 
the principle of non-refoulement: Opinion” in E. Feller, V. Turk and F. Nicholson eds., Refugee Protection 
in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection). Under the 1969 OAU 
Convention, this obligation also extends to protecting those who are compelled to flee as a result of 
“external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order.” 1969 
supra , art. I(2). 
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14(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, expressly denies 
the right to seek asylum to any person attempting to avoid “prosecutions genuinely 
arising from non-political crimes.”89 The 1967 U.N. Declaration on Territorial 
Asylum echoes closely the language of the exclusion clauses of refugee legislation 
providing that “the right to seek and to enjoy asylum may not be invoked by any 
person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that he has 
committed a crime against peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity in the 
international instruments drawn up to make provisions in respect of such crimes.”90 
Article 28 of the European Union Directive on minimum standards for giving 
temporary protection in the event of a mass influx clearly provides that displaced 
persons who are not refugees may be excluded from protection on grounds almost 
precisely equivalent to those set out in Article 1 F of the 1951 Refugee Convention. 91  
 
49. Although these exclusion-related restrictions are expressed as curbs on the exercise of 
an individual right, they are clearly reflective of the existence of corresponding duties 
on States not to shelter those seeking to avoid justice. In Resolution 3074 on the 
Principles of International Co-operation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition, and 
Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, the U.N 
General Assembly laid the foundations for an integrated approach to international 
justice and protection of human rights, linking exclusion in the context of asylum to 
the requirement for international cooperation in the punishment of serious 
international crimes.92 The Resolution also explicitly expresses the prohibition on 
granting asylum to serious criminals in terms of a restriction on the right of asylum of 
the State: “States shall not grant asylum to any person with respect to whom there are 
serious reasons for considering that he has committed a crime against peace, a war 
crime, or a crime against humanity.”93 Further, in Africa, through the operation of the 
OAU Convention on Terrorism, State parties have undertaken “ascertain, when 
granting asylum, that the asylum seeker is not involved in any terrorist act.”94  
 
Conclusion 
 
50. The armed conflicts raging in places such as the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and 
Sierra Leone in the 1990s have forced a new recognition of the intimate relationship 
between impunity, international human rights and international criminal law, 
amnesty, and refugee status. The five decades of impunity between World War II and 
the Yugoslav conflict have been strongly countered by the need to establish 
accountability, enforce international law, and promote enduring peace and security. 
Charles Taylor has been charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity by the 
                                                 
89 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra , art. 14(2). 
90 UN General Assembly Resolution 2312 (XXII) of 14 December 1967. 
91 European Union Directive on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass 
influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in 
receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 
2001.  
92 Principles of International Co-operation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition, and Punishment of Persons 
Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, GA res 3074 (XXVIII) (1973). 
93 U.N. General Assembly. Resolution 3074 (XXVIII) of 3 December 1973, at para. 7. 
94 O.A.U. Terrorism Convention, supra , art. 4 (2) (g). 
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Special Court for Sierra Leone, an internationalized court brokered by the United 
Nations. Nigeria cannot permit him to purport to enjoy refugee status or political 
asylum in Nigeria. If Nigeria is not willing to prosecute Charles Taylor, it must 
extradite him to the Special Court for Sierra Leone to stand trial on the charges 
against him. 
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